Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm HOA (123PA24, N.C.) 8/22/2025
Chickens, Covenants, and Community Governance
Chris Burti, Vice President and Senior Legal Counsel

The North Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision in this matter discussing an almost deceptively simple question: can sixty chickens qualify as "household pets" under an exception to a restrictive covenant prohibiting "animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind" in a planned residential community?

Beneath that surface-level issue, however, the case implicates broader doctrines of covenant interpretation, standards for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the proper role of juries in covenant disputes, and the tension between the free use of land and the collective governance of homeowner associations (HOAs). The Court's 4-3 decision reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated a jury's verdict against the plaintiff homeowners. Justice Riggs penned a detailed dissent emphasizing the unequal power between HOAs and individual homeowners and the traditional presumption favoring free use of land.

The Oak Grove Farm subdivision in Union County, developed in 1996, was governed by a "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions, and Easements." Among its provisions, section 13, titled "Livestock," stated:

"A maximum of three horses may be kept and stabled on any lot or combination of adjoining lots under common ownership. . .. No other animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind, shall be raised, bred, or kept on any lot, except that dogs, cats, or other household pets, may be kept provided that they (including horses) are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose."

The covenant thus permitted horses, prohibited livestock and poultry, but carved out an exception for "household pets" not maintained for commercial use.

After moving into Oak Grove Farm in 2017, the plaintiffs purchased five chickens, housing them in their garage before constructing an outdoor coop. Their flock eventually grew to around sixty birds of various breeds. One of the plaintiffs testified that she gave each chicken a name, interacted with them daily, and treated them as beloved pets. They insisted they never ate their chickens nor operated any egg business.

The HOA, however, viewed the flock as a prohibited keeping of poultry. In March 2020, it sent a compliance letter demanding removal of the chickens. When the plaintiffs refused, the HOA threatened $100 daily fines. The dispute escalated to litigation.

The plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court seeking declaratory relief, an injunction against fines, and damages for alleged selective enforcement and breach of fiduciary duty. The HOA counterclaimed for its own declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied, finding factual disputes for the jury.

At trial, the plaintiffs presented extensive testimony about their affectionate relationship with the chickens. They even introduced video exhibits of Ms. Schroeder playing with the chickens. The HOA, by contrast, emphasized the flock's size, inconsistencies in testimony about whether eggs had ever been sold, and the husband's inability to recall many of the birds' names and introduced a Facebook post where Ms. Schroeder wrote, "I sell farm fresh eggs."

The jury was instructed on two issues:

1. Whether the chickens were "household pets."
2. Only if so, whether they were "kept, bred, or maintained for a commercial purpose."

The jury unanimously answered "no" to the first question, making the second moot. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a directed verdict and JNOV. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that there were multiple trial errors. The Court of Appeals addressed only the JNOV question, holding that the evidence established as a matter of law that the chickens were household pets not kept for commercial use. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass'n, 293 N.C. App. 428 (2024). It concluded there was "not even a scintilla of evidence" to the contrary, reversed the trial court, and directed entry of judgment for the plaintiffs.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of both the HOA's petition and the plaintiffs' conditional petition concerning additional issues. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the jury's verdict. The majority addressed four key areas:

The Court reaffirmed that JNOV is a "demanding" remedy, to be granted "cautiously and sparingly." Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 387 N.C. 376, 379 (2025). Courts must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, granting the benefit of every reasonable inference. Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 369 (1985). A claim survives so long as there is "more than a scintilla" of supporting evidence-something more than "raw suspicion, conjecture, guess, surmise, or speculation." Vanguard, 387 N.C. at 380.

Applying this standard, the Court found ample evidence supporting the HOA's position:

The flock grew to around sixty birds, casting doubt on whether they could reasonably be treated as pets.

The Schroeders could not recall all names or even the precise flock count, undermining their claim of personal attachment.

A Facebook post by Mary Schroeder advertising "farm fresh eggs" supported an inference of commercial use and credibility concerns.

This constituted more than a scintilla of evidence, making the jury's verdict binding.

The plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in rejecting their requested nonpattern instructions on restrictive covenant interpretation, dictionary definitions of "pet" and "household," and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.

The Court held:

Covenant interpretation is a question of law for the court, not the jury. The trial judge had already construed the covenant to permit chickens if they qualified as "household pets" not kept for commercial purposes. Thus, instructing the jury on general rules of covenant interpretation (e.g., strict construction in favor of free use) would have confused rather than clarified, citing Muse v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 443 (1908).

Dictionary definitions of ordinary words are unnecessary, since jurors are presumed to understand plain English, citing State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 175 (1988). The plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to read definitions during closing arguments.

The trial court barred counsel from reading passages from Steiner v. Windrow Estates Home Owners Ass'n, 213 N.C. App. 454 (2011), and Russell v. Donaldson, 222 N.C. App. 702 (2012), to the jury. Citing State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 611 (1986), the Court reaffirmed that attorneys may not read facts or holdings from prior cases to suggest that jurors should reach a similar result. Because the jury was not tasked with interpreting restrictive covenants, case-law excerpts on strict construction were irrelevant. The trial court was deemed to have acted within its discretion.

The Plaintiffs also sought to admit the County Animal Control Ordinance definition of "animal" via another covenant clause. The Court held the ordinance was irrelevant and potentially misleading, as the operative covenant was the "livestock" provision, not the "pets" provision.

The majority concluded that:

"the plaintiffs received a fair trial free from prejudicial error. They were not entitled to a directed verdict or JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of evidence that their chickens were not household pets. This was an issue of fact for the jury to decide based on the ordinary meaning of the words in the restrictive covenants."

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated judgment for the HOA.

The dissenting opinion cautioned that the majority's approach undermines the principle that restrictive covenants must be strictly construed against restrictions on land use. Citing Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, 360 N.C. 547, 555 (2006), and Long v. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 268 (1967), the dissent contended that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of free use.it argued that the term "household pet" is inherently ambiguous. For example, the covenant did not specify whether every member of the household must consider an animal a pet. Thus, evidence that one of the plaintiffs did not personally bond with the chickens should not have been dispositive. At minimum, the ambiguity should have been resolved as a matter of law in the homeowners' favor.

The dissent criticized what it felt were the trial court's vague instructions, which left the jury without guidance on key questions, such as whether the number of animals was relevant or whether some chickens could be considered pets while others were not. Ambiguous instructions risked rendering the verdict fatally unclear, citing Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 710 (2021) in a footnote top the dissenting opinion.

The dissent highlighted the structural imbalance between HOAs and homeowners. Covenants are drafted by developers and HOAs wield disproportionate enforcement power, while homeowners have no opportunity to negotiate terms. Drawing parallels to adhesion contracts in banking (Taylor v. Bank of Am., N.A., 385 N.C. 783, 794-95 (2024) (Riggs, J., dissenting)), the dissent argues that ambiguities must be construed against the drafter.

The majority reaffirmed that covenant interpretation is a question of law for the court, but factual determinations-such as whether animals are "household pets"-belong to the jury. The dissent warned that this blurs the principle of strict construction against restrictions. The majority opinion illustrates the intersection of community governance, property rights, and contract law in the context of modern suburban living. While the majority vindicated the jury's role and reinforced the demanding JNOV standard, the dissent raised critical questions about fairness, ambiguity, and the balance of power between HOAs and homeowners.

For practitioners, the case reinforces the importance of careful covenant drafting, the evidentiary value of even modest conflicts in testimony, and the deference appellate courts will give to juries in disputes framed as factual. At the same time, the dissenting opinion signals potential fault lines for future litigation over restrictive covenants, particularly as more North Carolinians live under HOA governance.